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Abstract
Backgrounds: Staff in the hospital itself may be the source of a nosocomial outbreak (NO). But the role of
undetected carriers as an outbreak source is yet unknown.
Methods: A systematic review was conducted to evaluate outbreaks caused by health care workers (HCW). The
Worldwide Outbreak Database and PubMed served as primary sources of data. Articles in English, German or French
were included. Other reviews were excluded. There were no restrictions with respect to the date of publication.
Data on setting, pathogens, route of transmission, and characteristics of the HCW was retrieved. Data from large
outbreaks were compared to smaller outbreaks.
Results: 152 outbreaks were included, mainly from surgery, neonatology, and gynecology departments. Most
frequent corresponding infections were surgical site infections, infection by hepatitis B virus, and septicemia.
Hepatitis B virus (27 NO), S. aureus (49 NO) and S. pyogenes (19 NO) were the predominant pathogens involved.
59 outbreaks (41.5%) derived from physicians and 56 outbreaks (39.4%) derived from nurses. Transmission mainly
occurred via direct contact. Surgical and pediatric departments were significantly associated with smaller outbreaks,
and gynecology with larger outbreaks. Awareness of carrier status significantly decreased the risk of causing large
outbreaks.
Conclusions: As NO caused by HCW represent a rare event, screening of personnel should not be performed
regularly. However, if certain species of microorganisms are involved, the possibility of a carrier should be taken into
account.
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Background
Healthcare associated infections (HCAI) are infections
that are acquired as a result of healthcare interventions.
Most HCAI occur sporadically only. However, epidemics
of HCAI may also take place and are than called a noso-
comial outbreak (NO). NO always represent extremely
frightening incidents, but may still affect any medical de-
partment at any time in principle. Once a NO has been
recognized as such, an outbreak investigation is usually
initiated in order to discover its source. Doing so, the
outbreak’s source may get traced to a particular single
health care worker (HCW) in some of the cases. If now
a HCW, in fact, happens to be the most likely or proven
cause of pathogen spread to patients and nosocomial
infections, all of a sudden several uncertainties and
questions arise, for example: Was the HCW aware of
his/her carrier status? Were occupational physicians of
the hospital wrong at evaluating the risk of transmission
from a colonized or infected HCW? Are there obvious
breaches in infection control measures? Are there
specific risk factors that may have contributed to an
extraordinary high transmission rate?
There are several reports of NO that started from a
HCW. However, every report by itself is very much
influenced by the local situation. Thus, one can hardly
generalize the experiences from a single NO description.
Only a systematic evaluation of a large number of out-
break reports will provide a less biased assessment of
data.
This article presents findings of a systematic analysis
of all kinds of published NO that were caused by HCW.
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By this, we will provide HCW characteristics and factors
that may dramatically facilitate pathogen spread.
Methods
Retrieval strategy
We conducted a systematic review of the medical literature.
Search of the literature was performed on June 23rd 2010.
In order to find appropriate descriptions of NO we first of
all made a data request for outbreaks whose source was
“personnel” in the Outbreak Database (www.outbreak-data-
base.com). This is an internet-based, worldwide database
for NO continuously updated by the Institute for Hygiene
and Environmental Medicine, Charité – University Medi-
cine Berlin (Germany) currently containing over 2,900
outbreaks [1]. In a second step we supplemented our data
by a PubMed search on September 3rd 2010, consisting of
the following search terms [(“nosocomial”) AND (“out-
break” OR “epidemic”) AND (“personnel” OR “staff” OR
“health care worker”)]. Finally, we looked through the
references of the articles which had been included by then
to complete the search.
Exclusion and inclusion criteria
Besides staff in the hospital being the outbreak’s source, in-
clusion criteria were as follows: articles written in English,
German or French language. Reviews were excluded to
avoid bias. There were no restrictions with respect to the
date of publication.
Extracted data
(a) We extracted data on the setting (time, country, med-
ical department), patients (type of infections, causative
agent, number of fatal cases), (b) characteristics about the
staff that caused the outbreak (kind of profession, infec-
tion among themselves vs. colonization only, route of
transmission, awareness of their own positive carriage sta-
tus of pathogen, compliance to hand hygiene, length of
work experience), and (c) the infection control measures
implemented to terminate the outbreak (screening of
patients and/or staff, disinfection and sterilization
procedures, isolation of patients, application of antimicro-
bial substances, education of personnel, use of protective
clothing, improvement in hand hygiene, closure of ward,
sampling of medical devices and/or the environment,
changes in patient-staff ratio, use of vaccinations, no
implementing of any infection control measures at all).
Data was primarily extracted by one author (L.D.) and
than independently cross-checked by another author
(R.P.V.). A third author (P.G.) got involved in the case of
disagreement between the other two authors.
Large outbreaks
NO were defined as large outbreaks (LO), when the
number of affected patients was equal or greater than
the median number of patients in all NO.
Statistics
In the descriptive statistic, rates were calculated for LO
stratified by the following risk factors: Type of department,
age groups (neonates, infants, children, adolescents,
adults, seniors), type of ward (intensive care, peripheral
ward, outpatients clinic, operating theatre), outbreak
happening before or after 1989 (to identify the trend of
the past years and as this was the time when vaccination
against hepatitis B virus (HBV) was already recommended
in several countries, e. g. the USA [2,3]), causative agent,
specific characteristics of the source, and infection control
measures. For univariate analysis (contingency tables), the
Fisher exact test was used, with a significance level of 0.05.
Multiple logistic regression analysis was performed with
stepwise variable selection to detect LO with the
parameters mentioned above. We set p ≤ 0.05 for entering
a parameter into the model. We used the commercial stat-
istical package Statistical Analysis System (SAS, Version
9.2, the SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) for the
analysis. Significance level was set at 0.05.
Results
Included articles
At the time point of retrieval the Outbreak Database
comprised 222 articles in which HCW were filed as the
outbreak’s source. 116 descriptions thereof met the inclu-
sion criteria. Outbreaks in facilities other than hospitals (e.
g., nursing homes) got excluded, as did NO with a HCW
being suspected only (but not proven) the true source.
Altogether 5% of all outbreaks published in the Outbreak
Database were included. The PubMed search (609 hits) fi-
nally came up with 5 more NO reports. 31 additional
reports were found via the search of reference lists. Thus,
this systematic review is based on overall 152 NO
descriptions caused by HCWs (Figure 1). The complete
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Figure 1 Retrieval of articles.
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consists of 140 articles (9 authors described 2 NO and an-




The 152 NO took place in 26 countries, mainly in the US
(67 NO), the UK (29 NO), and France (8 NO). The time
frame of occurrence was 1958 through 2006. NO lasted
between 1 and 287 weeks (mean: 28.4; median: 10.5). 9
NO showed a polyphasic progress with more than one
peak in the epidemic curve.
Patients
Overall, 1,449 patients (thereof at least 51 fatal cases) were
affected ranging from 1 to 75 patients per NO (mean: 9.5;
median: 7.0). Thus, a number of patients ≥ 7 divided 76
large outbreaks (LO) from 76 other smaller NO.
Medical departments and type of ward
As shown in Table 1, departments of surgery (76 NO),
neonatology (41 NO), gynecology (20 NO), pediatrics
(9 NO), and internal medicine (2 NO) were most often
affected by NO derived from HCW. LO were less often
noticed in surgical departments (42.1%) compared to
other types of medical departments (59.1%). The same ap-
plies to pediatric departments where the proportion of LO
was 11.1% only vs. 53.2% in other medical fields. In 2 NO
no specific medical department was mentioned.
Transmission of most NO occurred in operating
theatres (63 NO) and on peripheral wards (59 NO). The
risk of LO via operating theatres was slightly decreased
(41.3% vs. 57.5%; p = 0.068) but failed to reach statistical
significance.
Infection types
Besides several cases of colonization, there were also at
least 960 documented cases of nosocomial infections
among the 1,449 patients. The most frequent nosocomial
infections were surgical site infections (SSI; 256), HBV
infections (212), septicemia (67), gastroenteritis (42),
hepatitis C virus infections (HCV) (21), urinary tract
infections (20), and meningitis (13).
Causative agent
Transmission of bacteria occurred in 108 of the 152 NO.
Viral spread (34 NO) and fungi (10 NO) were less often
the causative agents. Table 1 shows a detailed distribution
of the most frequently detected microorganisms in NO
caused by HCW which were S. aureus (49 NO), HBV (27
NO), and Group A streptococci (19 NO). Regardless of
the number of patients (LO vs. other NO), spread of the
pathogen via direct contact was the main route of trans-
mission, followed by droplets and airborne transmission.
Although the source was known (HCW), the specific way
of transmission still remained unknown in 8.6% of all NO.
Characteristics of index personnel
Despite their rather low proportion among hospital staff,
physicians were the group of professionals who caused
most outbreaks (59 NO [41.5%], thereof 30 NO caused by
surgeons) compared to 56 NO (39.4%) caused by nurses
(Figure 2). Other professions frequently involved were
technical staff (9 NO), kitchen staff (5 NO), and midwives
(5 NO).
A total of 73 of the spreading HCWs were colonized
only and 70 others were themselves infected by the patho-
gen (as described in the outbreak reports) before spread to
their patients took place (Table 1). If the index HCW was
colonized only (but not infected) large outbreaks were
more common (58.9%) compared to outbreaks where the
index person also showed signs and symptoms of infection
(43.0%). Especially HCW suffering from blood-borne
infections were less likely to become a super spreader
(33.3% vs. 54.4%; Table 1).
Data on work experience was available for few out-
break events only. However, a subgroup analysis of
HCW, stratified by the time of employment, revealed
that work experience of a HCW was neither a predicting
nor a protecting factor for being a super spreader later
on. In 18 NO (50.0%) the HCW had worked for less
than 5 years compared to 15 NO (41.7%) in which the
index HCW had work experience for at least 10 years.
Precise information about the spreading HCW with
respect to hand hygiene (HH) was also scarce. Only 37
authors provided information on the previous HH com-
pliance of the spreading HCW, thereof HH compliance
was considered “adequate” in 21 of 37 NO (56.8%) but
“insufficient” in 16 NO (43.2%).
Of the 152 spreading HCW only 14 declared that they
had previously been aware of their positive pathogen carrier
status; 10 of these 14 HCW were affected by some kind of
viral hepatitis. However, the HCW’s awareness of harboring
the pathogen significantly lowered the risk of subsequently
causing large outbreaks (21.4% vs. 52.5%; p = 0.045).
Infection control measures
In order to provide a complete overview on outbreaks
caused by HCW, corresponding measures were also
recorded in this systematic review. Screening for pathogen
carriage were the measures carried out most frequently as
seen in Figure 3. Furthermore, there were several infection
control measures that were more often performed in larger
outbreaks such as changes in disinfection and/or
sterilization processes (52 vs. 19 NO), enforcement of
hand hygiene compliance (42 vs. 28 NO), environmental
sampling (45 vs. 19 NO), and closure of an entire ward/
unit (17 vs. 5 NO).
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Table 1 Risk factors for the occurrence of large outbreaks (≥ 7 patients) as determined by univariate analysis (more
than one type may be affected)
Risk factor Risk factor present Risk factor lacking p-value
# LO # all NO % # LO # all NO %
departments (n=150)*
surgery 32 76 42.1 44 74 59.1 0.036
neonatology 24 41 58.5 52 109 47.7 0.274
gynecology 14 20 70.0 62 130 47.7 0.091
pediatrics 1 9 11.1 75 141 53.2 0.017
internal medicine 1 2 50.0 75 148 50.7 1.000
other 11 21 52.4 65 129 50.4 1.000
type of ward (n=150)*
operating theatre 26 63 41.3 50 87 57.5 0.068
peripheral ward 33 59 55.9 43 91 47.3 0.320
intensive care unit 17 28 60.7 59 122 48.4 0.296
outpatient clinic 4 9 44.4 72 141 51.1 0.744
age groups (n=147)*
neonates (≤ 1 m) 24 39 61.5 52 108 48.1 0.191
infants (1 m - 1 y) 3 6 50.0 73 141 51.8 1.000
children (> 1–12 y) 4 14 28.6 72 133 54.1 0.092
adolescents (13–17 y) 9 13 69.2 67 134 50.0 0.249
adults (18–69 y) 49 93 52.7 27 54 50.0 0.864
seniors (≥ 70 y) 13 26 50.0 63 121 52.1 1.000
microorganism (n=152)
bacteria 58 108 53.7 19 44 43.2 0.284
viruses 14 34 41.2 63 118 53.4 0.245
fungi 5 10 50.0 72 142 50.7 1.000
species (n=152)
S. aureus 26 49 53.1 51 103 49.5 0.730
hepatitis B virus 9 27 33.3 68 125 54.4 0.057
S. pyogenes 12 19 63.2 65 133 48.9 0.328
Candida spp. 5 8 62.5 72 144 50.0 0.719
P. aeruginosa 2 7 28.6 75 145 51.7 0.273
transmission (n=152)
contact 53 105 50.5 24 47 51.1 1.000
droplets 8 17 47.1 69 135 51.1 0.801
airborne 11 16 68.8 66 136 48.5 0.860
foodborne 3 6 50.0 74 146 50.7 1.000
unknown 3 13 23.1 74 139 53.2 0.045
HCW characteristics
colonization only 43 73 58.9 34 79 43.0 0.054
HWC infected 31 70 44.3 46 82 56.1 0.193
blood borne infection 9 27 33.3 68 125 54.4 0.057
aware of carrier status 3 14 21.4 62 118 52.5 0.045
proper HH compliance 12 21 57.1 9 16 56.3 1.000
work experience > 5 y 9 18 50.0 8 12 66.7 0.536
LO = large outbreak (≥ 7 patients affected); NO = nosocomial outbreak; HCW = health care worker; HH = hand hygiene; *more than one type may be affected.
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Multiple logistic regression analysis
In order to identify independent factors that increase the
risk of a LO, a multiple logistic regression analysis was
performed as described above. The remaining charac-
teristics after stepwise variable selection are shown in
Table 2.
HCW in gynecological departments caused significantly
more often large outbreaks with an odds ratio (OR) =
6.89, in contrast to surgical departments (OR = 0.42) and
pediatrics (OR = 0.05) where large outbreaks were much
less common. In addition, awareness of the HCW which is



























Figure 2 Occupation of health care workers causing nosocomial outbreaks.























Figure 3 Distribution of infection control measures initiated in large and small outbreaks (* = significant difference).
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(by 89%) of causing a LO. In the last 20 years there was
some tendency towards smaller outbreaks.
Discussion
NO in surgery
Most of all included NO caused by staff happened in
surgical departments (76 of 150 NO), but the univariate
and the multiple regression analysis specified these
outbreaks to be significantly smaller than the other NO.
Surgeons may extraordinary strong focus on nosocomial
infections, because those represent the most frequent
complication in their medical field. Thus, spreaders may
be detected earlier which then will lead to smaller NO.
The operating theatre was the location of transmission
in 80% (61 of 76 NO) of all NO in surgery. An explan-
ation may be that there is a very short distance between
head and hands of the surgeon and the patient, who is ra-
ther vulnerable during invasive procedures. 142 of 411
infections transmitted during operations (130 HBV, 10
HCV and 2 HIV) were blood borne. Surgeons often suffer
from small undetected excoriations or injuries caused by
sharp bone fragments, needles and other instruments.
Transmission may occur through minimal lesions in
gloves [4]. Harpaz et al. [5] described an NO where a sur-
geon infected 19 patients with HBV, but the exact route of
transmission remained unclear. He had performed an ad-
equate operating technique and no obvious breaches in
hygiene could be discovered. Other common agents were
gram positive bacteria like Streptococcus Group A (121
infections) or S. aureus (101 infections). These agents
caused mostly SSI (87.8%; 195 of 222 infections).
NO in gynecology
NO in gynecology are not only very common (20 NO;
thereof 11 NO in obstetrics), they are also significantly
larger (OR = 6.89) than NO in other medical
departments (Table 2). In 7 NO a gynecologist transmit-
ted HBV to a patient during an operation. And in the
remaining 2 NO kitchen workers contaminated food
with enteritic Salmonella and infected patients in the
whole hospital. In obstetrics the most common agent
was S. aureus (5 of 11 NO), which was being transmit-
ted to neonates and parturient. There were also other
agents transmitted via contact (Streptococcus group A
in 4 NO and S. marcescens in 1 NO). During a delivery
the women giving birth have close and prolonged
contact with e.g. midwifes (4 NO), which facilitates to
transmit agents via contact. Dave et al. [6] reported 2
NO where midwifes transmitted S. aureus to 12 and 10
parturients and caused staphylococcal scalded skin
syndrome (SSSS). The latest NO in obstetrics was an
NO in France described by Occelli et al. [7] where an
auxiliary nurse was nasal colonized with S. aureus and
caused bullous impetigo in 7 neonates and colonization
in 3 further neonates. Perhaps the tendency to early
discharging of patients after birth may contribute to the
problem of large NO in gynecology, because infections
may occur only after discharge and therefore NO maybe
detected later.
HCW characteristics
The only significant detail we know about the spreading
HCW is that those HCW who were aware of their posi-
tive carrier status caused smaller outbreaks than the me-
dian (Tables 1 and 2). There were 14 HCW that caused
NO, although they knew of their infectivity, 12
physicians, 1 nurse and 1 acupuncturist. Thereof 10
employees who had a viral hepatitis (9 HBV, 1 HCV).
Being a carrier and knowing so may improve compli-
ance to general infection control measures and by this
Table 2 Independent risk factors for the occurrence of large outbreaks (≥ 7 patients) as determined by multiple
logistic regression analysis with stepwise variable selection
Risk factor # all NO Odds ratio 95% confidence interval p-value
departments
surgery 76 0.42 0.19–0.92 0.030
gynecology 20 6.89 1.55–30.63 0.011
pediatrics 9 0.05 0.00–0.45 0.008
occurrence after 1989
reference value: no 71 1.00 n. d. 0.024
yes 72 0.48 0.22–1.06 0.068
aware of carrier status
reference value: no 116 1.00 n. d. 0.024
yes 14 0.11 0.02–0.55 0.008
transmission
unknown 13 0.16 0.03–0.75 0.020
NO = nosocomial outbreak; n. d. = not defined.
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lower the risk of pathogen spread. This result also
suggests the presumption that HCW pay more attention
to a possible NO, if they know of their risk to infect
their patients. They detect NO earlier and therefore can
terminate it earlier with less affected patients.
There is also the possibility that HCW denied awareness
of their carrier status, because they could fear of job-
related and judicial consequences, but a viral hepatitis is
an infection that is probably more difficult to deny. In
addition, viral hepatitis represents an infection, which is
not easily transmitted and so NO may have been smaller.
There is a tendency of blood borne infections to smaller
NO, which is with a p = 0.57 nearly significant (Table 1).
HCW that were only colonized and not infected caused
rather large NO (58.9%) than others (43.0%) (p = 0.54)
(Table 1). Only 1.4% of the colonized HCW were aware of
their carrier status, compared to 17.1% of infected HCW.
HCW with more than 5 years of work experience caused
LO just as often as HCW with 5 or less years of work
experience did (Table 1). Experience of HCW does not
necessarily provide significant more safety in patient care.
In fact, there is a tendency of becoming less thorough in
the compliance to recommendations [8].
Figure 2 shows that physicians caused most NO in abso-
lute numbers (59 of 144 NO). Compared to the rather
small proportion of physicians at all hospital staff, one
may wonder why this group of HCW has likely been
involved in NO. One explanation may be, that physicians
have often and intensive contact, for example during inva-
sive procedures, where the patient is rather vulnerable.
Nearly all NO caused by physicians (72.9%; 43 of 59 NO)
were transmitted in the operating theatre. NO caused by
physicians may also get publicized more frequently than
NO due to other HCW. Finally we cannot exclude the
possibility of inadequate HH by physicians [9].
General limitations
The most important limitation distorting these results is
the publication bias. Presumably NO will have been
detected more often than they get published. Supposedly
those NO, that have been published have more often been
of certain interest or came up with significant results.
Furthermore we could only include those outbreaks
where the route of transmission could clearly be found
out. Therefore easily transmittable agents like Norovirus
and others are surely underrepresented. Many hospitals
may have restrained from publishing their NO because
of fear of bad reputation.
Another limitation is incomplete information in articles.
For example we cannot provide data on the extent of
cooperation between ward staff and infection control
personnel, microbiologists, occupational health physicians
or public health colleagues, but its quality often has a
significant impact on both the prevention and the
management of NO. There is also a lack of data on most
socio-economic factors and/or underlying diseases of the
patients that may predispose for a nosocomial infection.
Especially information concerning the spreading HCW
(e.g., on his HBV vaccination status) was scarce and
complicated this analysis. The limit of 7 patients (= median)
for LO is rather high, but reflects that chances of publica-
tion outrange chances of outbreak detection.
Conclusion
Practical consequences. Screening of personnel should not
be performed regularly, as less than 10% of NO are caused
by HCW. However, if certain species of microorganisms
(e.g. S. aureus, HBV, S. pyogenes) are involved, the possibil-
ity of a carrier should be taken into account.
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